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Abstract
The success of neural networks across most
machine learning tasks and the persistence of
adversarial examples have made the verifica-
tion of such models an important quest. Sev-
eral techniques have been successfully devel-
oped to verify robustness, and are now able to
evaluate neural networks with thousands of
nodes. The main weakness of this approach
is in the specification: robustness is asserted
on a validation set consisting of a finite set of
examples, i.e. locally.
We propose a notion of global robustness
based on generative models, which asserts the
robustness on a very large and representative
set of examples. We show how this can be
used for verifying neural networks. In this
paper we experimentally explore the merits
of this approach, and show how it can be used
to construct realistic adversarial examples.
1 Introduction
We consider the task of certifying the correctness of
an image classifier, i.e. a system taking as input an
image and categorising it. As a main example we will
consider the MNIST classification task, which consists
in categorising hand-written digits. Our experimen-
tal results are later reproduced for the drop-in dataset
Fashion MNIST (Xiao et al. (2017)).
The usual evaluation procedure consists in setting
aside from the dataset a validation set, and to report
on the success percentage of the image classifier on
the validation set. With this procedure, it is com-
monly accepted that the MNIST classification task
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is solved, with some convolutional networks achieving
above 99.7% accuracy (see e.g. Ciregan et al. (2012);
Wan et al. (2013)). Further results suggest that even
the best convolutional networks cannot be considered
to be robust, given the persistence of adversarial ex-
amples: a small perturbation – invisible to the human
eye – in images from the dataset is enough to induce
misclassification (Szegedy et al. (2014)).
This is a key motivation for the verification of neural
networks: can we assert the robustness of a neural net-
work, i.e. the absence of adversarial examples? This
question has generated a growing interest in the past
years at the crossing of different research communities
(see e.g. Huang et al. (2017); Katz et al. (2017); Weng
et al. (2018); Gehr et al. (2018); Mirman et al. (2018);
Gopinath et al. (2018); Katz et al. (2019)), with a
range of prototype tools achieving impressive results.
The robustness question is formulated as follows: given
an image x and ε > 0, are all ε-perturbations of x cor-
rectly classified?
We point to a weakness of the formalisation: it is local,
meaning it is asserted for a given image x (and then
typically checked against a finite set of images). In this
paper, we investigate a global approach for specifying
the robustness of an image classifier. Let us start from
the ultimate robustness objective, which reads:
For every category, for every real-life image
of this category and for every perturbation of
this image, the perturbed image is correctly
classified.
Formalising this raises three questions:
1. How do we quantify over all real-life images?
2. What are perturbed images?
3. How do we effectively check robustness?
In this work we propose a formalisation based on gen-
erative models. A generative model is a system taking
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as input a random noise and generating images, in
other words it represents a probabilistic distribution
over images.
Our specification depends on two parameters (ε, δ).
Informally, it reads:
An image classifier is (ε, δ)-robust with re-
spect to a generative model if the probabil-
ity that for a noise x, all ε-perturbations of x
generate correctly classified images is at least
1− δ.
The remainder of the paper presents experiments sup-
porting the claims that the global robustness specifi-
cation has the following important properties.
Global. The first question stated above is about
quantifying over all images. The global robustness we
propose addresses this point by (implicitly) quantify-
ing over a very large and representative set of images.
Robust. The second question is about the notion of
perturbed images. The essence of generative models
is to produce images reminiscent of real images (from
the dataset); hence testing against images given by
a generative model includes the very important per-
turbation aspect present in the intuitive definition of
correctness.
Effective. The third question is about effectivity. We
will explain that global robustness can be effectively
evaluated for image classifiers built using neural net-
works.
Related work
Xiao et al. (2018) train generative models for finding
adversarial examples, and more specifically introduce
a different training procedure (based on a new objec-
tive function) whose goal is to produce adversarial ex-
amples. Our approach is different in that we use gen-
erative models with the usual training procedure and
objective, which is to produce a wide range of realistic
images.
2 Global Correctness
This section serves as a technical warm-up for the next
one: we introduce the notion of global correctness, a
step towards our main definition of global robustness.
We use Rd for representing images with ||·|| the infinity
norm over Rd, and let C be the set of categories, so an
image classifier represents a function C : Rd → C.
A generative model represents a distribution over im-
ages, and in effect is a neural network which takes as
input a random noise in the form of a p-dimensional
vector x and produces an image G(x). Hence it rep-
resents a function G : Rp → Rd. We typically use
a Gaussian distribution for the random noise, written
x ∼ N (0, 1).
Our first definition is of global correctness, it relies on a
first key but simple idea, which is to compose a genera-
tive model G with an image classifier C: we construct
a new neural network C ◦ G by simply rewiring the
output of G to the input of C, so C ◦G represents a
distribution over categories. Indeed, it takes as input
a random noise and outputs a category.
Figure 1: Composition of a generative model with an
image classifier
Definition 1 (Global Correctness). Given for each
c ∈ C a generative model Gc for images of category c,
we say that the image classifier C is δ-correct with
respect to the generative models (Gc)c∈C if for each
c ∈ C,
Px∼N (0,1)(C ◦Gc(x) = c) ≥ 1− δ.
In words, the probability that for a noise x the image
generated (using Gc) is correctly classified (by C) is
at least 1− δ.
Assumptions
Our definition of global correctness hinges on two
properties of generative models:
1. generative models produce a wide variety of im-
ages,
2. generative models produce (almost only) realistic
images.
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The first assumption is the reason for the success
of generative adversarial networks (GAN) (Good-
fellow et al. (2014)). We refer for instance
to Karras et al. (2018) and to the attached web-
site thispersondoesnotexist.com for a demo.
In our experiments the generative models we used are
out of the shelf generative adversarial networks (GAN)
(Goodfellow et al. (2014)), with 4 hidden layers of re-
spectively 256, 512, 1024, and 784 nodes, producing
images of single digits.
To test the second assumption we performed a first
experiment called the manual score experiment. We
picked 100 digit images using a generative model and
asked 5 individuals to tell for each of them whether
they are “near-perfect”, “perturbed but clearly iden-
tifiable”, “hard to identify”, or “rubbish”, and which
digit they represent. The results are that 96 images
were correctly identified; among them 63 images were
declared “near-perfect” by all individuals, with an-
other 26 including “perturbed but clearly identifiable”,
and 8 were considered “hard to identify” by at least
one individual yet correctly identified. The remaining
4 were “rubbish” or incorrectly identified. It follows
that against this generative model, we should require
an image classifier to be at least .89-correct, and even
.96-correct to match human perception.
Algorithm
To check whether a classifier is δ-correct, the Monte
Carlo integration method is a natural approach: we
sample n random noises x1, . . . , xn, and count for how
many xi’s we have that C ◦ Gc(x) = c. The central
limit theorem states that the ratio of positives over
n converges to Px∼N (0,1)(C ◦ Gc(x) = c) as 1√n . It
follows that n = 104 samples gives a 10−2 precision on
this number.
In practice, rather than sampling the random noises
independently, we form (large) batches and leverage
the tensor-based computation, enabling efficient GPU
computation.
3 Global Robustness
We introduce the notion of global robustness, which
gives stronger guarantees than global correctness. In-
deed, it includes the notion of perturbations for im-
ages.
The usual notion of robustness, which we call here local
robustness, can be defined as follows.
Definition 2 (Local Robustness). We say that the
image classifier C is ε-robust around the image y ∈ Rd
of category c if
∀y′, ||y − y′|| ≤ ε =⇒ C(y′) = c.
In words, all ε-perturbations of y are correctly classi-
fied (by C).
One important aspect in this definition is the choice
of the norm for the perturbations (here we use the
infinity norm). We ignore this as it will not play a role
in our definition of robustness. A wealth of techniques
have been developed for checking local robustness of
neural networks, with state of the art tools being able
to handle nets with thousands of neurons.
Assumptions
Our definition of global robustness is supported by the
two properties of generative models discussed above in
the context of global correctness, plus a third one:
3. generative models produce perturbations of real-
istic images.
To illustrate this we designed a second experiment
called the random walk experiment : we perform a ran-
dom walk on the space of random noises while observ-
ing the ensued sequence of images produced by the
generative model. More specifically, we pick a ran-
dom noise x0, and define a sequence (xi)i≥0 of ran-
dom noises with xi+1 obtained from xi by adding a
small random noise to xi; this induces the sequence of
images (G(xi))i≥0. The result is best visualised in an
animated GIF (see the Github repository), see also the
first 16 images in Figure 2. This supports the claim
that images produced with similar random noises are
(often) close to each other; in other words the genera-
tive model is (almost everywhere) continuous.
Our definition of global robustness is reminiscent of the
provably approximately correct learning framework de-
veloped by Valiant (1984). It features two parameters.
The first parameter, δ, quantifies the probability that
a generative model produces a realistic image. The
second parameter, ε, measures the perturbations on
the noise, which by the continuity property discussed
above transfers to perturbations of the produced im-
ages.
Definition 3 (Global Robustness). Given for each
c ∈ C a generative model Gc for images of category c,
we say that the image classifier C is (ε, δ)-robust with
respect to the generative models (Gc)c∈C if for each
c ∈ C,
Px∼N (0,1)(∀x′, ||x−x′|| ≤ ε =⇒ C◦Gc(x′) = c) ≥ 1−δ.
In words, the probability that for a noise x, all ε-
perturbations of x generate (using G) images correctly
classified (by C) is at least 1− δ.
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Figure 2: The random walk experiment
Algorithm
To check whether a classifier is (ε, δ)-robust, we extend
the previous ideas using the Monte Carlo integration:
we sample n random noises x1, . . . , xn, and count for
how many xi’s the following property holds:
∀x, ||xi − x|| ≤ ε =⇒ C ◦Gc(x) = c.
The central limit theorem states that the ratio of pos-
itives over n converges to
Px∼N (0,1)(∀x′, ||x− x′|| ≤ ε =⇒ C ◦Gc(x′) = c)
as 1√
n
. As before, it follows that n = 104 samples gives
a 10−2 precision on this number.
In other words, checking global robustness reduces to
combining Monte Carlo integration with checking local
robustness.
4 Experiments
The code for all experiments can be found on the
Github repository
https://github.com/mohitiitb/
NeuralNetworkVerification_GlobalRobustness.
All experiments are presented in Jupyter notebook for-
mat with pre-trained models to be easily reproduced.
Our experiments are all reproduced on the drop-in
Fashion-MNIST dataset (Xiao et al. (2017)), obtaining
similar results.
We report on experiments designed to assess the ben-
efit of these two notions, whose common denominator
is to go from a local property to a global one by com-
posing with a generative model.
We first evaluate the global correctness of several im-
age classifiers, showing that it provides a finer way
of evaluating them than the usual test set. We then
turn to global robustness and show how the negation
of robustness can be witnessed by realistic adversarial
examples.
The second set of experiments addresses the fact that
both global correctness and robustness notions depend
on the choice of a generative model. We show that
this dependence can be made small, but that it can
also be used for refining the correctness and robustness
notions.
Choice of networks
In all the experiments, our base case for image
classifiers have 3 hidden layers of increasing capaci-
ties: the first one, referred to as “small”, has layers
with (32, 64, 200) (number of nodes), “medium” corre-
sponds to (64, 128, 256), and “large” to (64, 128, 512).
The generative model are as described above, with 4
hidden layers of respectively 256, 512, 1024, and 784
nodes.
For each of these three architectures we either use the
standard MNIST training set (6,000 images of each
digit), or an augmented training set (24,000 images),
obtained by rotations, shear, and shifts. The same
distinction applies to GANs: the “simple GAN” uses
the standard training set, and the “augmented GAN”
the augmented training set.
Finally, we work with two networks obtained through
robust training procedures. The first one was proposed
by Ma¸dry et al. (2018) for the MNIST Adversarial
Example Challenge (the goal of the challenge was to
find adversarial examples, see below), and the second
one was defined by Papernot et al. (2016) through the
process of defense distillation.
Evaluating Global Correctness
We evaluated the global correctness of all the image
classifiers mentioned above against simple and aug-
mented GANs, and reported the results in the table
below. The last column is the usual validation pro-
cedure, meaning the number of correct classification
on the MNIST test set of 10,000 images. They all
perform very well, and close to perfectly (above 99%),
against this metric, hence cannot be distinguished. Yet
the composition with a generative model reveals that
their performance outside of the test set are actually
different. It is instructive to study the outliers for each
image classifier, i.e. the generated images which are
incorrectly classified. We refer to the Github reposi-
tory for more experimental results along these lines.
Finding Realistic Adversarial Examples
Checking the global robustness of an image classifier
is out of reach for state of the art verification tools.
Indeed, a single robustness check on a medium size
net takes somewhere between dozens of seconds to a
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Classifier simple GAN augmented GAN test set
Standard training set
small 98.89 92.82 99.79
medium 99.15 93.16 99.76
large 99.38 93.80 99.80
Augmented training set
small 97.84 95.2 99.90
medium 99.11 96.53 99.86
large 99.25 97.66 99.84
Robust training procedures
Ma¸dry et al. (2018) 98.87 93.17 99.6
Papernot et al. (2016) 99.64 94.78 99.17
few minutes, and to get a decent approximation we
need to perform tens of thousands local robustness
checks. Hence with considerable computational efforts
we could analyse one image classifier, but could not
perform a wider comparison of different training pro-
cedures and influence on different aspects. Thus our
experiments focus on the negation of robustness, which
is finding realistic adversarial examples, that we define
now.
Definition 4 (Realistic Adversarial Example). An ε-
realistic adversarial example for an image classifier C
with respect to a generative model G is an image G(x)
such that there exists another image G(x′) with
||x− x′|| ≤ ε and C ◦G(x) 6= C ◦G(x′)
In words, x and x′ are two ε-close random noises which
generate images G(x) and G(x′) that are classified dif-
ferently by C.
Note that a realistic adversarial example is not nec-
essarily an adversarial example: the images G(x) and
G(x′) may differ by more than ε. However, this is
the assumption 3. discussed when defining global ro-
bustness, if x and x′ are close, then typically G(x)
and G(x′) are two very resemblant images, so the two
notions are indeed close.
We introduce two algorithms for finding realistic ad-
versarial examples, which are directly inspired by al-
gorithms developed for finding adversarial examples.
The key difference is that realistic adversarial exam-
ples are searched by analysing the composed network
C ◦G.
Let us consider two digits, for the sake of explanation,
3 and 8. We have a generative model G8 generating
images of 8 and an image classifier C.
The first algorithm is a black-box attack, meaning that
it does not have access to the inner structure of the
networks and it can only simulate them. It consists in
sampling random noises, and performing a local search
for a few steps. From a random noise x, we inspect the
random noise x + δ for a few small random noises δ,
and choose the random noise x′ maximising the score
of 3 by the net C ◦G8, written C ◦G8(xi)[3] in the
pseudocode given in Algorithm 1. The algorithm is
repeatedly run until a realistic adversarial example is
found.
Algorithm 1: The black-box attack for the digits 3
and 8.
Data: A generative model G8 and an image classifier
C. A parameter ε > 0.
Nstep ← 16 (number of steps)
Ndir ← 10 (number of directions)
x0 ∼ N (0, 1)
for i = 0 to Nstep − 1 do
smax ← C ◦G8(xi)[3] (score of 3)
xi+1 ← xi
for j = 0 to Ndir − 1 do
δj ∼ N (0, εNstep )
s← C ◦G8(xi + δj)[3]
if s > smax then
smax ← s
xi+1 ← xi + δj
if C ◦G8(x0) 6= C ◦G8(xi+1) then
return x0 (ε-realistic adversarial example)
The second algorithm is a white-box attack, meaning
that it uses the inner structure of the networks. It
is similar to the previous one, except that the local
search is replaced by a gradient ascent to maximise
the score of 3 by the net C ◦ G8. In other words,
instead of choosing a direction at random, it follows
the gradient to maximise the score. It is reminiscent
of the projected gradient descent (PGD) attack, but
performed on the composed network. The pseudocode
is given in Algorithm 2.
Both attacks successfully find realistic adversarial ex-
amples within less than a minute. The adjective “real-
istic”, which is subjective, is justified as follows: most
attacks constructing adversarial examples create un-
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Algorithm 2: The white-box attack for the digits 3
and 8.
Data: A generative model G8 and an image classifier
C. A parameter ε > 0.
Nstep ← 16 (number of steps)
α← εNstep (step)
x0 ∼ N (0, 1)
for i = 0 to Nstep − 1 do
xi+1 ← xi − α ·GradC◦G8(xi)[3]
if C ◦G8(x0) 6= C ◦G8(xi+1) then
return x0 (ε-realistic adversarial example)
realistic images by adding noise or modifying pixels,
while with our definition the realistic adversarial ex-
amples are images produced by the generative model,
hence potentially more realistic. See Figure 3 for some
examples.
On the Dependence on the Generative Model
Both global correctness and robustness notions are de-
fined with respect to a generative model. This raises
a question: how much does it depend on the choice of
the generative model?
To answer this question we trained two GANs using
the exact same training procedure but with two dis-
joint training sets, and used the two GANs to evaluate
several image classifiers. The outcome is that the two
GANs yield sensibly the same results against all image
classifiers. This suggests that the global correctness in-
deed does not depend dramatically on the choice of the
generative model, provided that it is reasonably good
and well-trained. We refer to the Github repository
for a complete exposition of the results.
Since the training set of the MNIST dataset contains
6,000 images of each digit, splitting it in two would
not yield two large enough training sets. Hence we
used the extended MNIST (EMNIST) dataset Cohen
et al. (2017), which provided us with (roughly) 34,000
images of each digit, hence two disjoint datasets of
about 17,000 images.
On the Influence of Data Augmentation
Data augmentation is a classical technique for increas-
ing the size of a training set, it consists in creating new
training data by applying a set of mild transformations
to the existing training set. In the case of digit images,
common transformations include rotations, shear, and
shifts.
Unsurprisingly, crossing the two training sets, e.g. us-
ing the standard training set for the image classifier
and an augmented one for the generative model yields
worse results than when using the same training set.
More interestingly, the robust networks Ma¸dry et al.
(2018); Papernot et al. (2016), which are trained us-
ing an improved procedure but based on the standard
training set, perform well against generative models
trained on the augmented training set. In other words,
one outcome of the improved training procedure is
to better capture the natural image transformations,
even if they were never used in training.
5 Conclusions
We defined two notions: global correctness and global
robustness, based on generative models, aiming at
quantifying the usability of an image classifier. We
performed some experiments on the MNIST dataset
to understand the merits and limits of our definitions.
An important challenge lies ahead: to make the ver-
ification of global robustness doable in a reasonable
amount of time and computational effort.
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